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LEGAL ABSTRACTS AND NOTES
Magazinc, 38 (12): 16-7 (June 1957). The pre-
liminary testing of this new film indicates a useable
exposure index of 1600. Enlargement up to 5 or
6 times can be made. The film is sensitive to
aging. (JDN)
The Restoration of Filed Off Inscriptions on
Plastic-E. Kirchinke, Arch. ffir Kriminologie,
117: 93 (1956). By moistening the area with a
swab dipped in benzene, CC4, or pyridine and then
illuminating with UV, the inscription can be
restored. Recorded by photography. (JDN)
A Qualitative Test for Nitroglycerine-J.
Lammond, The Analyst, 82: 768-9 (Nov. 1957).
Nitroglycerine in ethanol produces a black pre-
cipitate with Nesslin's reagents if the nitroglycer-
ine is present above 1 %. Interfering substances in
in propellants can be removed by extraction with
80% v/v ethanol. (JDN)
POLICE SCIENCE LEGAL ABSTRACTS AND NOTES
Arthur Rollin*
Eavesdropping Not Illegal Under New Jersey
Anti-Wire Tap Statute-The furtive telephone
conversations of a company employee with persons
outside the plant aroused the suspicions of the
plant switchboard operator. The operator, in
handling the employee's calls, kept the switch-
board open and listened to the conversations
without the knowledge or consent of the partici-
pants. Through this means, it was learned that the
employee and several other parties were stealing
from the company. They were charged with con-
spiracy to steal, and at the trial the switchboard
operator testified as to the conversation she had
overheard, in support of one of the conspirators
who testified on behalf of the state. On appeal
from their convictions, the defendants asserted
that the operator's testimony was improperly
admitted. The Superior Court of New Jersey
affirmed the conviction and held that "the covert
listening to a telephone conversation through an
extension telephone or switchboard without the
knowledge of the participants, while a generally
reprehensible invasion of the right of privacy, is
not within the compass of" the present wire
tapping statute. State v. Vanderhave, 136 A.2d
296 (N.J. 1957).
The New Jersey wire tap statute (NJ.S. 2A:
146-1,N.J.S.A.) states that "Any person who will-
fully and maliciously: a. Cuts, breaks, ta t s or
makes any connection with a telegraph or tele-
phone line, wire, cable or instrument belonging to
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any other person; or b. Reads, takes, copies, makes
use of, discloses, publishes or testifies concerning
a message, communication or report intended for
any other person and passing over any such tele-
graph or telephone line, wire or cable in this
state,... is guilty of a misdemeanor." The court
interpreted section (a) to encompass only mechani-
cal devices, and noted that no such device was used
by the operator. The court concluded that the
defendants' assertion that the divulgence of the
intercepted conversations in open court violated
section (b) was without basis. Section (b) relates
back, said the court, to section (a) and only per-
tains to conversations intercepted through mechan-
ical devices. The court also stated that it was not
faced with the question of the admissibility of
evidence obtained in violation of the wire tap
statute, but noted that the court has a long
standing rule permitting evidence of that nature.
Handwriting Expert Can be Tested During
Cross-examination With Samples Not Introduced
During Direct Examination7-The defendant was
charged with forging his wife's name to a certificate
of ownership of an automobile owned by her. Since
the wife had disappeared, the only evidence the
prosecution introduced was the testimony of a
handwriting expert. This expert testified that he
had analyzed the voluntary samples of the defend-
ant's handwriting and the authenticated samples of
his wife's handwriting that were introduced into
evidence, and had compared both with the signa-
ture on the certificate. The expert testified that,
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in his opinion, the signature on the certificate
was that of the defendant and not his wife. Upon
cross-examination of the handwriting expert,
defendant's counsel twice sought to confront the
expert with genuine samples of the wife's hand-
writing that had not previously been introduced
during direct examination. Defense counsel's
purpose was to test the expert's opinion by seeing
if he could identify the writer of one sample,
and then to test his opinion as to whether two
such samples were written by the same person.
The court sustained objections to both efforts on
the sole ground that the testing documents were
not "within the realm of the expert's direct
examination." The Appellate Division of the
Superior Court of New Jersey, in reversing the
defendant's conviction, held that the refusal to
allow defense counsel to test the opinion of the
handwriting expert with samples of handwriting
that had not been introduced into evidence during
direct examination was prejudicial error. Slate r,.
Buhta, 134 A.2d 738 (N.J. 1957).
The court conceded that the extent of cross-
examination is within the discretion of the trial
judge, but such discretion was not adequately
exercised. Since the evidence presented by the
prosecution consisted solely of the handwriting
expert's testimony, it was essential that the
defense be given an unhampered opportunity to
cross-examine the expert. The court stated that
the tests desired by the defense counsel were
potentially very illuminating, and indicated that
their denial would be proper only if they could
not be concluded expeditiously and without undue
confusion. In commenting on the reason given for
for the denial of the tests, the court said that
limiting tests to samples already introduced into
evidence would be "useless" because the expert
already knew their origin. The court said that
"the very efficacy of such a test derives from the
fact that the (expert) witness has not already
identified the writer of the testing specimens from
extrinsic information and can be tested on the
basis of the inherent characteristics of the writing
itself."
Knowledge of Violation Not Prerequisite For
Conviction of Wire Tapping-A husband, desiring
to obtain evidence for use in an action for divorce,
hired the defendant, a private detective. The wife
Nva living in a separate apartment with a private
phone listed in her name. As part of his investiga-
tion, the defendant hired a self-described expert
in electronics, eavesdropping and wiretapping,
who had been so engaged for many years. The
apartment next to that of the wife was rented and
a hole was drilled in an adjoining wall. An elabo-
rate wiretapping device was then set up and one of
the defendant's employees, on twenty-four hour
duty, was alerted by a buzzer or lamp everytime
the wife's phone was used. The device not only
allowed an employee to hear all phone conversa-
tions, but it also recorded them on tape. The
expert testified that the device worked perfectly.
The defendant was convicted of conspiracy to
violate, and for violation of the federal statute
prohibiting an unauthorized interception oi
telephone communications. The United States
Court of Appeals, in affirming the conviction, held
that a violation of the Federal Communications
Act can occur even though a person does not
know he is violating the act. United Slate ,. Gris.
247 F.2d 860 (2nd Cir. 1957).
The defendant contended that since lie had no
idea that lie was violating federal law when lie
installed the wiretapping device to a telephone
line of a client's wife, his acts did not constitute a
punishable violation of the F.C.A. In rejecting
this contention, the court said that the act does
not require that a defendant realize his conduct
was unlawful. A violation occurs, the court stated,
if a defendant knew what he was doing, what he
was doing violated the act, and he intended to do
what he did. The statute imposes a penalty on
any person who willfully and knowingly (foes any
act that the F.C.A. has declared unlawful.
Contents of Telephone Conversation Overheard
on Extention Admissible in Federal Court When
One Party Consents-The defendant telephoned
one of his creditors and threatened his life unless
the creditor returned the collateral securing the
defendant's loan. The creditor refused to comply
and called the local police. The creditor, antici-
pating another call, requested the police to station
officers at his home and listen in on telephone
calls. When the defendant called again, hi threats
on the life of the creditor were overheard by two
officers using an extension telephone. The extension
had not been connected for the use of the officers
and was a regular installation of long s:anding in
the creditor's home. Over timely obJection, the
officers testified as to what they had overheard,
and the defendant was convicted for transmitting
an interstate communication that threatened a
life. The United States Supreme Court, with two
;_Vol. 49
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judges dissenting affirmed the defendant's convic-
tion and held the divulgence of a conversation
overheard through the use of a regular telephone
extension, with the consent of one of the conversing
parties, did not violate the Federal Communica-
tions Act, and consequently the information so
obtained was admissible in a federal court. Rath-
baunz v. U.S., U.S. (1957).
The defendant's contention that the testimony
of the police officers was inadmissible rested on
Section 605 of the F.C.A. That section states that
"... no person not being authorized by the sender
shall intercept any communication and divulge
the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect,
or meaning of such intercepted communication to
any person..." (Italics added) The Court, in
looking to the intention of Congress, determined
that there had been no "interception" within the
meaning of the act. Congress, according to the
Court, did not want to limit the normal use of the
telephone, which embraces'the use of an extension
by third parties in both the home and office. In
addition, the Court said that another portion of
Section of 605 clearly infers that one of the parties
can use the communication for his own benefit
or have some other party use it for him. "The
communication itself is not privileged, and one
party may not force the other to secrecy merely
by using a telephone," according to the Court.
Thus, since the officers had the consent of one of
the parties, Section 605 was not violated.
The dissent advocated a strict construction of
Section 605, as was 'done in prior decisions con-
cerning that section, and said the language," no
person not being authorized by the sender", should
not be twisted into meaning no person not being
authorized by either party to a telephone conver-
sation, the sender or receiver. (Italics added) The
dissent also drew a distinction between the usual
third party that listens to a conversation through
an extension, such as a secretary, and a police
officer.
New York Speed Law Unconstitutionally Vague
and Indefinite-The defendant was proceeding
down a two-lane rural highway and attempted to
pass another car moving in the same direction. He
swung into the lefthand lane and struck a cyclist
riding in the opposite direction. The defendant was
not charged with violating an express speed dmit
or reckless driving, but he was charged and con-
victed for what is termed a "traffic infraction".
The provision under which the defendant was con-
victed stated that "no person shall operate a
motor vehicle... upon a public highway at such
a speed as to endanger the life, limb or property
of any person, nor at a rate of speed greater than
will permit such person to bring the vehicle to a
stop without injury to another or his property."
New York Vehicle and Traffic Laws, 556, subd. 1.
The Court of Appeals of New York reversed the
defendant's conviction and held the statute upon
which his conviction rested was unconstitutional
because it was too vague and indefinite to constitute
an adequate definition of criminal -conduct and
did not provide a sufficient standard by which a
driver's conduct could be tested. People v. Firth,
3 N.Y.2d 472, 146 N.E.2d 682 (1957).
Although the -defendant's conviction was not
for a "crime," the court stated that rules of crim-
inal law were applicable to traffic infraction prose-
cutions. The court had to determine, as in con-
struing a criminal statute, whether the statute was
"clear and positive" so that it gave"" 'unequivocal
warning' to citizens of the rule which is to be
obeyed." The court 'concluded that the statutory
verbiage was practically meaningless because it
was impossible to drive a car at any rate, of speed
without the danger 'of injury to person or property.
Howiever, the court expressly refused to comment
on the constitutionality if the statute had read
"that a rate of speed is-daigerous and constitutes a
violation- when -it -is. unreasonable or -imprudent
under the surrounding conditions." Statutes with
'the above wording,- the court noted, have been
upheld in other jurisdictions.
No Entrapment When Idea For Crime Not
Implanted By Police-Federal agents' placed a
recording device on, an informer, who was present
when the. defendants discussed, their plans to
imuggle psittacine birds into the United States
from Mexico. The agents, even though they had a
recording disclosing an' intention to commit a
crime, waited until -after the 'defendants had
smuggled the birds into the' country to arrest them.
The defendants were tried 'and found guilty of
conspiring to smuggle psittacine birds into the
United States, of smuggling such birds into the
United States, and of receiving, concealing, and
transporting such birds. On appeal, the defendants
claimed that a request for an instruction on entrap-
ment was improperly denied in the trial court. In
affirming the defendants' conviction, the United
States Court of Appeals held that an instruction on
entrapment was not required where no idea was
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planted in defendants' minds by the governments
agents. Murray :. United States, 250 F.2d 489 (9th
Cir. 1957).
The court reasoned, that, since the agents merely
permitted a violation to occur in order to obtain
facts sufficient to insure a conviction, they could
not be considered guilty of entrapment. Entrap-
ment was defined by the court as requiring the
enforcement agency to "plant the idea of the com-
mission of the crime in the minds of the defend-
ants." Since there was no evidence presented to
the jury to show that the agents planted any ideas
in the defendants' minds, the court concluded
that an instruction on entrapment by the trial
court would be improper. The court made no
comment on the propriety of using a secret re-
cording machine by the police.
All Evidence Obtained During An Unreasonable
Delay In Arraignment Inadmissible-The defend-
ant was arrested at 6:40 p.m. as he returned home
from work. During the evening and following
morning he was questioned about a murder that
had been committed in the perpetration of a rape.
The defendant made his first oral admission that
he was guilty at about 3:15 a.m., and then repeated
his statements to various police officers that
morning. Although there were many judges avail-
able to arraign the defendant around 9:00 a.m.,
he was not arraigned but taken to the scene of the
rape and there he re-enacted the crime. Next, the
police, without a search warrant but with the
defendant's consent, went with the defendant to
his apartment where the police obtained certain
clothing belonging to him. Sometime later, the
defendant was finally arraigned. At the trial, the
defendant moved to supress his admissions and the
evidence found at his apartment. The motion was
denied, and he was convicted. The Urited States
Court of Appeals reversed the conviction and held
that the "Mallory rule" rendered all evidence ob-
tained during an unreasonable, and thus illegal,
delay in arraignment inadmissible in a federal
court. Watson v. United States, 249 F.2d 106 (D.C.
Cir. 1957).
The court based its decision on the recent
Supreme Court decision of Mallory z'. U -nitrd State,,
354 U.S. 449 (1957). The court determined that
the facts and circunm-tances of the instant case s,
closely paralleled the Mallory case that it couhl
find no basis for distinction. The Court of Appeals
opinion stated that in the Mallory case the Su-
preme Court has analyzed the Federal Rules (i
Criminal Procedure §§ 4(a), 4(b), 5(a), 5(b), and
5(c) which require "that an arrested person must
be arraigned 'before a judicial officer as quickly as
possible so that he may be advised of his rights and
so that the issue of probable cause may be
promptly determined.' Supplementing the affirina-
the command of the Rules, the (Supreme)Court
tells us that the accused 'is not to be taken to
police headquarters in order to carry out a process
of inquiry that lends itself, even if not so designed,
to eliciting damaging statements to support the
arrest and ultimately his guilt'." (Emphasis sup-
plied by the Court of Appeals). -owever, the court
did comment that a brief delay in arraignment
was permissible for the "booking" of an accused,
and also to allow the police to check voluntary
statements of the accused, if they are susceptible of
quick verification. But, an accused cannot be taken
to police headquarters, according to the court, for
the purpose of subjecting him to interrogation in
order to determine whether he shall be charged,
or even subjecting him to an inquiry or course oi
conduct which unintentionally lends itself to
eliciting inculpatory statements upon which his
arrest or conviction may be predicated. Thus,
the court points out, if the circumstances do
justify a delay in arraignment, it cannot be of
such a nature so as to give the police an oppor-
tunitv for the "extraction" of a confession. From
the above reasoning, the court concluded that
since the defendant's admissions and his consent
to search and seize his property has been given
prior to any judicial caution, all were inadmissible.
(For other recent case abstracts see pp. 69-72
supra)
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